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‘I have bought it all for you’
Mark Pawlowski considers the law on gifts, trusts and estoppel
equities in relation to disputes over ownership of chattels
following a relationship breakdown, death or bankruptcy
‘It is apparent that a claimant
may successfully acquire an
interest in personal property
by way of gift or declaration
of trust. The decision in Rowe
recognises the significance of
the constructive trust, but
there is little or no direct
authority on the application
of proprietary estoppel to
property other than land.’
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor 
of property law at the
University of Greenwich
CHATTELS
M
ost of the case law on the 
entitlement to family assets 
is concerned with disputes 
regarding beneficial ownership of mat-
rimonial (or quasi-matrimonial) homes.
This, of course, is not surprising given
that the family home is likely to be 
the most substantial asset acquired by
the parties during the period of their
marriage or cohabitation. 
Disputes about property ownership,
however, may not always be confined 
to the home and may include entitle-
ment to other assets, such as chattels,
owned by one of the parties. In this con-
text, the concepts of the constructive
trust and proprietary estoppel (which
readily apply to land) have been far less
developed by the courts, although, in
principle, there seems little reason why
they should not form the basis of entitle-
ment in appropriate cases.
Before considering this question, how-
ever, it will be convenient to consider
other methods of acquiring title to per-
sonal property – notably, by means of a
gift and a declaration of trust.
Gift of chattels
For an effective gift of chattels, there must
be a delivery to the donee of the subject
matter of the gift. Such delivery is usually
achieved by handing physical possession
of the property to the intended recipient:
see Miller v Miller [1735]. But this is not
necessary in all cases. 
In Pascoe v Turner [1979] the parties
lived together as man and wife until the
claimant (the legal owner) left the house
for another woman. Before leaving, he
assured the defendant that the house
was hers and everything in it. In relation
to the contents, the Court of Appeal held
that the claimant had made a gift of the
property to her. The gift was complete
because the defendant was already in
possession of them as a bailee when he
declared the gift.
It is also sufficient if the donor hands
the donee dominion over the property
by granting them the means to control it.
So, for example, if the property is kept in
a locked box, dominion would be given
if the donor handed the key to the box to
the donee: see Re Wasserberg [1915]. 
Apart from handing physical posses-
sion or dominion, it is, of course,
possible to effect a valid gift of chattels
by means of a deed of gift. 
Re Cole [1963]
The case of Re Cole is illustrative of the
position. Here, a husband had acquired
the lease of a large mansion, which he
furnished mainly with articles pur-
chased by himself. Some months later,
he took his wife to the new home and
into one room, put his hands over her
eyes and then uncovered them, saying:
‘Look’. He then accompanied her into
other rooms (where she handled certain
of the articles) and said: ‘It is all yours’. 
The husband and wife lived in the
house together and always considered the
furniture to be the property of the wife.
Later, the husband became bankrupt and
the wife claimed most of the furniture as
her property. The Court of Appeal held
that, where a husband and wife were
living together in the same house, posses-
sion of the furniture followed the legal
title to the furniture, although the wife
might have used and enjoyed it during
the parties’ period of occupation. The
rationale is that, in these circumstances, it
is not possible to say who has possession
(since possession is mixed), so the matter
is decided simply by title. 
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In the absence, therefore, of a deliv-
ery or change of possession of the
furniture to the wife, there was no gift
transferring the property to her. In the
words of Pearson LJ:
Counsel for the [wife’s] main proposition
was that there is a perfect gift where the
intending donor shows the chattel to the
donee and utters words of present gift in
the presence of the donee and the chattel.
He also relied on several special features
of this case as adding strength to his main
proposition. The special features men-
tioned were (a) that the bankrupt brought
the applicant to the chattels, (b) that
some of the chattels were bulky, so that
handing over would not be a natural mode
of transfer, (c) that the chattels were in a
place where they would be under the
applicant’s physical control, and she could
touch and move them, and (d) that the
applicant handled some of the chattels in
the bankrupt’s presence. The argument
was clearly and cogently presented, but, in
the end, the answer to it is simply that it
fails to show any delivery of the chattels.
Delivery was needed to perfect the gift of
the chattels…
Re Kirkland (1964)
The decision in Re Cole was applied and
followed in Re Kirkland, where the
deceased’s mistress claimed that certain
furniture had been given to her by him
during his lifetime. 
As in Re Cole, the deceased had taken
the claimant on a tour of inspection of
the house and said: ‘I have bought it all
for you’. On subsequent occasions, he
told visitors that the furniture belonged
to the claimant. The fact, therefore, that
he had intended to make a gift of the
furniture was undisputed. 
The Court of Appeal, however, held
that, in the absence of a change of pos-
session, the intended gift had not been
perfected. Delivery, in the case of per-
sonal chattels, meant either manual
delivery of the items or of some token
part of the subject-matter. Alternatively,
there had to be such a change of posses-
sion (actual or constructive) so as 
to effectively vest possession in the
intended donee.
Conclusions to be drawn from case law
It is apparent from the foregoing that a
claimant may have considerable diffi-
culty in establishing an immediate gift
of chattels belonging to one of the par-
ties. Quite apart from the question of
whether any words of present gift were
actually spoken by the legal owner, the
mere act of showing or bringing the
claimant to the items (or allowing the
claimant to handle the items) would not
by itself constitute delivery or a change
in possession of them. It is doubtful also
whether a party can invoke trust law in
order to perfect the gift in equity. In
Milroy v Lord [1862] Turner LJ said:
… if the settlement is intended to be
effectuated by one of the modes to which
I have referred, the court will not give
effect to it by applying another of those
modes. If it is intended to take effect by
transfer, the court will not hold the
intended transfer to operate as a declara-
tion of trust, for then every imperfect
instrument would be made effectual by
being converted into a perfect trust.
The basic principle, therefore, is that
the courts will not treat an incomplete
gift as a valid declaration of trust. 
Constructive trust
In the family context, constructive trust
cases have almost exclusively concerned
claims to the home. However, the deci-
sion in Rowe v Prance [1999] (discussed in
the box ‘Declaration of trust’, opposite)
provides a notable exception. 
Here the deputy judge concluded,
applying Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991],
that the facts also established a common
intention constructive trust based on 
the express discussions of the parties
regarding ownership of the yacht. There
was also sufficient detriment to support
such a trust in the claimant giving up
her tenancy and putting her furniture
into storage (as well as some domestic
work and purchase of food). 
Interestingly, the deputy judge felt
unable to assess the appropriate size 
of the claimant’s share applying con-
structive trust principles – despite the
argument, on her behalf, that the agree-
ment or understanding reached between
the parties quantified her interest as a
half share. Instead, he preferred to base
his decision on a finding of an express
declaration of trust. 
In the light of more recent authority,
however (see Oxley v Hiscock [2004]), the
appropriate extent of the claimant’s
share falls to be determined by a
detailed assessment of the whole course
of dealing between the parties in rela-
tion to the property. This, of course,
gives the court considerable flexibility
in its search for a just result: see, most
recently, Ledger-Beadell v Peach [2006].
Thus, in Rowe, although nothing express
was said about the size of the parties’
respective shares in the yacht, the regu-
lar use of the word ‘our’ indicated an
intention that there was no distinction
to be drawn between the claimant and
the defendant so far as concerned own-
ership of the chattel. 
The discussion about security also
suggested that the claimant was intended
to have a substantial interest. It is submit-
ted, therefore, that even if this did not
indicate that the shares were to be equal,
it was open to the court to apply the
maxim that equality is equity.
Constructive trust doctrine has again
been applied in the context of the 
beneficial ownership of a motor yacht 
in the recent case of Parrott v Parkin
[2007]. In this case, however, Aikens J
was unable to find any evidence of
express discussions between the couple
regarding equitable entitlement and,
consequently, he concluded that there
was nothing to displace the presump-
tion of a resulting trust in favour of the
claimant who had provided most of the
purchase price.  
Proprietary estoppel
A spouse or cohabitee may also be able to
rely on proprietary estoppel as a means
of claiming title to a family chattel. This, 
it is submitted, is implicit from the 
decision in Rowe, which recognises the
appropriateness of applying constructive
trust principles in the context of personal
property, and the general acceptance in
The Court of Appeal held in  Re Kirkland that in the
absence of a change of possession, the intended gift
had not been perfected. Delivery, in the case of
personal chattels, meant either manual delivery of
the items or of some token part of the subject matter.
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of an action by the legal owner, but 
also as a sword – capable of grounding a
distinct and separate cause of action in
equity. In this sense, the estoppel is 
capable of creating rights in property 
on behalf of the claimant who has suc-
cessfully asserted an equity based on
assurance and detrimental reliance.
There is no direct English authority,
however, on the question of whether 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is
applicable exclusively to chattels, as
well as realty. Historically, all the cases
concern the application of the doctrine
to rights and interests in and over land.
There are, however, several dicta which
suggest that the estoppel may not be
limited to land. 
In Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v
Twitchings [1976] Lord Denning MR
drew no distinction between goods or
land when discussing the application of
the doctrine. He said:
There are many cases where the true
owner of goods or of land has led
another to believe that he is not the
owner, or, at any rate, is not claiming an
interest therein, or that there is no objec-
tion to what the other is doing. In such
cases it has been held repeatedly that the
owner is not allowed to go back on what
he has led the other to believe. So much
so that his own title to the property, be it
land or goods, has been held to be lim-
ited or extinguished, and new rights and
interests have been created therein. And
this operates by reason of his conduct –
what he has led the other to believe –
even though he never intended it.
This view was cited with apparent
approval in Western Fish Products Ltd 
v Penwith DC [1981], where Megaw LJ,
delivering the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal, opined that the principle of
proprietary estoppel ‘may extend to
other forms of property’. More recently,
in Baird Textile, referred to above, Mance
LJ defined the scope of proprietary
estoppel as ‘probably’ extending to
other property. Similarly, Sir Andrew
modern case law that there is really no
difference in analysis between construc-
tive trust and proprietary estoppel in
cases of this kind. 
The latter view has been endorsed by
the Court of Appeal in Oxley (see above),
where Chadwick LJ concluded that, in
each case, the court is simply supplying
(or imputing) a common intention as to
the parties’ respective shares on the basis
of a notion of fairness (or doing justice to
the parties) in the light of all the relevant
circumstances. In the landmark ruling in
Yaxley v Gott [2000] Walker LJ also opined
that, in this context:
… the species of constructive trust based
on ‘common intention’… is so closely
akin to, if not indistinguishable from 
proprietary estoppel.
Under English law, proprietary (like
promissory) estoppel is a species of
equitable estoppel. While the require-
ments of inducement and detrimental
reliance are broadly the same for both,
one important distinction (which has
been reiterated in recent case law) is that
promissory estoppel cannot generate an
independent cause of action, since it is
concerned primarily with preventing a
contracting party from resiling from
their representations or promises if the
other party has acted in reliance on
them: see Combe v Combe [1951]; Baird
Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc
[2001] and White v Riverside Housing
Association Ltd [2005]. 
By contrast, proprietary estoppel may
be used not only as a shield in defence 
Proprietary estoppel may be used, not only as a
shield in defence of an action by the legal owner, but
also as a sword – capable of grounding a distinct and
separate cause of action in equity.
The mechanism of the declaration of trust may allow a claimant to acquire a beneficial share in
property without proof of any detrimental reliance, which is an essential requirement to found
a successful claim based on constructive trust and proprietary estoppel doctrine.
Rowe v Prance [1999]
In Rowe the claimant was a widow who, for a period of 14 years, had an intimate relationship
with the defendant, a married man of considerable private means. During their relationship,
he purchased a yacht for £172,000 that was registered in his sole name, the defendant 
giving the excuse that a joint registration was not possible because the claimant did not
possess an ocean master’s certificate.The yacht, however, was renamed so as to incorporate
the parties’ respective names.The claimant gave up her rented house and put her furniture in
storage to base herself on the yacht, although she was there predominantly at weekends only,
spending the remainder of her time in bed and breakfast accommodation. In a letter to the
claimant, the defendant promised her that his absences would shortly cease and that the
yacht would be theirs to share so that they could live together. Significantly, in numerous
conversations, both before and after the purchase of the yacht, the defendant referred to it 
as ‘ours’ or ‘our boat’.
Mr Nicholas Warren QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division), applying the
earlier case in Paul v Constance [1977], held that the defendant’s repeated use of the word ‘our’
when referring to the yacht and his assurances that the claimant’s ‘security’ was her interest in it
(coupled with his explanation as to why he alone could be registered as owner) evidenced a
clear understanding that she had a beneficial interest in the property. On the facts, therefore, the
defendant had constituted himself a trustee of the yacht for himself and the claimant in equal
shares. Moreover, such declaration, being a trust of personalty, did not have to be evidenced in
writing, under s53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925, and could be declared without using
technical words such as ‘trust’: see Re Kayford Ltd (In liquidation) [1975]. Similarly, in the earlier
case of Paul, the repetition of the words ‘the money is as much yours as mine’ was also held
sufficient to create a valid express trust in favour of the claimant.
It is evident from these cases that, although an isolated, loose conversation will not give rise
to a valid declaration of trust (see, for example, Jones v Lock [1865]), the repetition of words
by the legal owner, especially in the context of an intimate relationship, indicating that the
property is to be as much the claimant’s as their own, will be sufficient. Significantly also, as
mentioned earlier, in both Rowe and Paul the claimant acquired a beneficial share in the
property without proof of reliance or detriment.
Declaration of trust
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Morritt VC, referring to the Western
case, characterised the estoppel as creat-
ing: ‘a cause of action… limited to cases
involving property rights, whether or
not confined to land’. 
The doctrine appears to have been
applied to an insurance policy in Re
Foster, Hudson v Foster (No 2) [1938] and,
more significantly, in several modern
cases to the deceased’s residuary per-
sonalty, as well as land.
Extending estoppel
In Re Basham (dec’d) [1986] the deceased’s
net estate comprised a cottage, furniture
and other chattels and some cash in a
current and deposit account. 
The deceased had assured the claim-
ant that she would inherit all her
property on her death. The court drew no
distinction between the various items of
the deceased’s property, referring simply
to the claimant’s equity as extending to
the whole of the net estate. 
Similarly, in Jennings v Rice [2002] the
deceased’s estate comprised not only a
house (valued at £420,000) but also furni-
ture (worth about £15,000) and £583,615
on deposit. Here again, neither Weeks J
(at first instance) nor the Court of Appeal
made any distinction in respect of these
assets when considering the applicability
of the doctrine. In both courts it was 
tacitly assumed that the estoppel would
extend to the whole of the deceased’s
property. See also Ottey v Grundy [2002],
where the successful estoppel claim
related to an apartment in Jamaica
(valued at £36,000) and a life interest in a
houseboat moored in Chelsea, London
(estimated at £280,000). 
Establishing detriment
Assuming, therefore, that the doctrine
of proprietary estoppel is of general
application to property, there is no
reason why a spouse (or cohabitee)
should not be able to mount a success-
ful claim in equity to a family chattel, 
provided they can establish the re-
quisite elements of an assurance and
detrimental reliance. 
Let us suppose, for example, that in
Rowe the claimant had relied on the
defendant’s promises by spending her
own money on restoring or repairing
the yacht. Let us assume also that this
had been done with the defendant’s
knowledge. The expenditure of money
on improvements to the property in
reliance on the legal owner’s assurance
is, of course, a ‘classic way’ in which a
detriment can be established: see Shaida
v Kindlane Ltd [1982] per HHJ Paul
Baker QC. 
In these circumstances, it is sub-
mitted, a claim based on proprietary
estoppel would have also succeeded,
giving the claimant an estoppel equity
that the court would have satisfied 
by means of an appropriate award that
did justice to all the parties. In Rowe
this would have meant giving the
claimant an equal beneficial share in the
proceeds of sale of the yacht – an out-
come which would not differ from the
actual decision based on an express or
constructive trust.
Conclusion
It is apparent that a claimant may suc-
cessfully acquire an interest in personal
property by way of gift or declaration of
trust. The decision in Rowe also openly
recognises the significance of the con-
structive trust in this context, but there is
little or no direct authority on the appli-
cation of proprietary estoppel to property
other than land. 
Although several of the English cases
have tacitly assumed that the doctrine
does apply to chattels where the claim
also relates to land, it remains to be seen
how far the courts will be prepared to go
in acknowledging the estoppel equity
where the subject-matter of the claim is
exclusively personalty. 
With the continuing assimilation of
the constructive trust and proprietary 
estoppel doctrines under one unifying
concept of unconscionability, there seems
little justification for drawing artificial 
boundaries between different species of
property. ■
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